T he National Social Health Maintenance Organization (SHMO) Demonstration, operating under congressionally mandated waivers, had two goals. First, it aimed to expand coverage of community and nursing home care in a controlled manner, and, second, it attempted to link these expanded care services with a complete acute care system.
Like HMOs, SHMOs are financed on a prepaid, capitated, at-risk basis. Medicare beneficiaries voluntarily join the SHMOs similar to joining HMOs under the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA). 1 Three revenue sources finance SHMOs: (1) Medicare pays 100 percent of its expected costs in the locality using the TEFRA adjusted average per capita costs, or AAPCC; (2) the beneficiary pays a premium ranging across the sites from $25 per month to $49 per month; and (3) Medicaid funds are a part of the financing for members who are eligible for Medicaid. 2 Unlike TEFRA HMOs, SHMOs are provided higher reimbursement for severely disabled enrollees living in the community.
With these features, the SHMO is breaking important ground for long term care insurance, high-cost case management, Medicare catastrophic insurance, and improved HMO benefits for older persons. Because of the importance of SHMOs, the SHMO Consortium was established by Brandeis University with the four test sites: Elderplan, Inc., Brooklyn, New York; Kaiser Permanente's Medicare Plus II, Portland, Oregon; SCAN Health Plan, Inc., Long Beach, California; and Seniors Plus, Minneapolis, Minnesota. The consortium's purpose is twofold: to conduct research on management and policy issues to improve the operations of the four sites, and to develop and disseminate knowledge needed to improve the financing and delivery of health services for the elderly.
In this article, we examine the initial operating experience of the four sites. We cover enrollment and marketing, case-mix, the impact of "queuing" disabled applicants through waiting lists, hospital utilization, expanded care costs, and financial performance. In addition to highlighting the accomplishments and unresolved problems of the demonstration in the first two years of operation, we also identify several policy issues that will need to be addressed should policymakers ultimately decide to adopt the SHMO model. since each site was striving for a representative mix of Medicare enrollees, 4,000 members overall would be needed to assure an adequate sample size of functionally impaired members. This was viewed as important since much of the SHMO evaluation is focusing on the costs and benefits of the program as a model for caring for the frail and disabled elderly.
Exhibit 1 shows enrollment by site for the first eight quarters of the program. Other than the Kaiser Permanente site, first-year enrollment was very disappointing. By the end of the first year, Kaiser's Medicare Plus II had 3,174 enrollees compared to 1,140 at SCAN, 776 at Elderplan, and only 433 at Seniors Plus. Exhibit 1 also shows that intensive marketing and sales programs implemented in the second year paid off, especially at Seniors Plus and Elderplan. Elderplan had 2,571 members by December 1986, SCAN had 2,062, and Seniors Plus had 1,688. This moved all three sites closer to enrollment needed to break even. Although initial break-even projections were at 4,000 members, experience shows that the break-even point is lower than this at the two HMO-affiliated sites and higher at the two sites that formed new HMOs to demonstrate the SHMO. The revised break-even estimates at Elderplan (5,600) and SCAN (3,900), the two stand-alone sites, are substantially higher than at Seniors Plus (1, 850) , which is associated with Group Health, Inc., a large HMO. Similarly, Kaiser Permanente reached the break-even point early in the demonstration.
Exhibit 1 Quarterly Summary Of Social HMO Enrollment, Active Members Per Month
Marketing. There are several hypotheses as to why the SHMOs have had such a difficult time marketing. It is well known that the vast majority of the elderly mistakenly believe that Medicare, Medicare supplemental insurance, and TEFRA HMO policies already provide chronic care benefits. Thus, it may not be clear to the elderly what they are getting for the additional cost. Although the sites were permitted to limit the number of disabled persons who could enroll, they chose not to advertise that fact. Therefore, from the perspective of consumers who understood open enrollment provisions, they could delay enrollment until they needed chronic care services.
Although survey data from the evaluation are not yet available, on-site staff close to the marketing efforts feel that a variety of other factors created enrollment problems, at least for some sites. These include the need for consumers to change physicians, the higher cost of the SHMO relative to HMOs, lack of name recognition, sponsors' lack of experience in marketing and sales, and the demonstration status of the program, which had to be mentioned in marketing literature. The sites are spending considerable time and resources to better understand their markets, their products, and their marketing methods. They have moved increasingly to add sales staff to follow up leads generated by direct mail and other outreach. It should be noted that the early experience of commercial carriers attempting to sell long-term care insurance parallels that of the SHMO. 3 Initially, the SHMOs planned-for between 12 and 20 percent of their enrollees to be eligible for Medicaid. These proportions would be greater than such persons' numbers in the community. As with the Medicare market, Medicaid enrollment lagged behind these initial plans. At the end of 1986, only SCAN came close to these levels, with 10.7 percent Medicaid members. The other sites were far lower: Elderplan (4.1 percent), Kaiser Permanente (2.4 percent), and Seniors Plus (1.3 percent). Hypotheses for low Medicaid enrollment include less attention to marketing to this smaller segment, the difficulties in marketing through the welfare system, and the fact that Medicaid recipients already have long term care benefits.
The Social HMO Population
Because the SHMO demonstration is testing the financial viability and desirability of adding chronic care services to existing Medicare benefits, it is important to enroll a representative population. In particular, the general relevance of the findings is strengthened if SHMO populations have a chronic care risk profile that is similar to the Medicare population. Exhibits 2 and 3 present comparisons of SHMO enrollees and Medicare beneficiaries with regard to factors known to be associated with the use of formal chronic care services. Data from HMO enrollees were obtained by a self-report questionnaire (The Health Status Form), and data on Medicare beneficiaries are from the 1982 National Long-Term Care Survey.
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SHMOs have fewer "young old" (ages sixty-five to sixty-nine) and slightly more "old old" (over age eighty). However, the two populations are substantially different in the proportion of enrollees living aloneone of the best predictors of the need for formal chronic care services. Slightly over 35 percent of SHMO enrollees are living alone compared to 30 percent of the Medicare population. Exhibit 3 shows that SHMO members and Medicare beneficiaries living in the community are similar in their distribution of two commonly used measures of functional disabilities: the activities of daily living and instrumental activities of daily living. The percentages are almost identical for individuals who had problems requiring human assistance in bathing, dressing, using the toilet, and getting in and out of bed. However, twice as many SHMO members (1.8 percent) needed assistance with eating as did Medicare beneficiaries (0.9 percent).
Similarly, the two populations had comparable distributions on the six items related to instrumental activities of daily living measured for both populations (laundry, meal preparation, shopping, money management, taking medication, and getting places). Although a higher proportion of SHMO members needed assistance getting places (14.5 percent) than did the Medicare population-(8.9 percent), given the differences in the methods of collecting the information, differences of this magnitude may not be significant. It is also important to note that one important shortcoming of the Health Status Form database is that it does not provide information on the distribution of cognitive functioning-one of the better predictors of nursing home placement.
Although the SHMO population in aggregate resembles the Medicare population, there is some variation across the four sites on important indicators, as shown in Exhibits 4 and 5. Of particular interest are differences in the percentage of members who are over age eighty, the percentage who live alone, and the percentage who have several daily living problems that require assistance. Exhibit 4 provides details on these proportions. It is clear from this exhibit that, at least for items upon which we had information, SCAN is serving an older, more disabled population than any of the other sites. It will be important to trace the implications these case-mix differences have on utilization and cost.
In summary, while there are differences among sites on some measures, on the whole the members at all sites appear to be very much like the older people residing in the community, including a minority of 4 to 7 percent with limitations in activities of daily living. This case-mix appears to embody a financially viable risk pool, and so far the SHMOs have been able to maintain this mix. Finally, this balanced case-mix is necessary for demonstrating the model's impact on cost, utilization patterns, and treatment outcomes for the impaired subgroups.
The Impact Of Queuing The Severely Disabled
Because SHMOs offer a considerably richer benefit package than existing Medigap plans or HMOs, SHMO planners feared adverse selection and sought a mechanism to protect themselves if a disproportionate number of disabled persons sought to enroll. While government officials were sympathetic to the planners' concerns, they did not want to give the sites complete discretion as to whom they enrolled for fear that they might select only favorable risks. An accord was reached that helped alleviate both parties' concerns. While officials would not permit the SHMOs to exclude bad risks through health screening, they did permit the sites to close enrollment to the severely impaired if their proportions exceeded 4 percent to 5 percent of new members and also to queue moderately impaired if their proportions exceeded 10 percent to 17 percent. These figures represented best estimates of the proportion of the elderly residing in the community who were functionally impaired. The use of queuing impaired applicants was at the discretion of the sites, and all but Kaiser chose to use it at least for some time for the severely impaired. No site has queued moderately impaired since the early months of the demonstration.
It is important to explore the role of queuing in keeping the SHMO population similar to the general Medicare population with regard to the distribution of functional disabilities. Furthermore, it is important to explore what the case-mixes at Elderplan, SCAN, and Seniors Plus might have looked like had they not been permitted to queue.
Exhibit 6 presents data on the percentage of the enrolled population who are severely impaired, as measured by the need for assistance with one or more activities of daily living, and the resulting proportion of severely impaired if half or all of those on the queue actually joined the respective plans. As the exhibit indicates, the lack of queuing could have had serious consequences for case-mix at Elderplan and Seniors Plus. If all persons on the queue in June 1986 had been allowed and actually chose to join, the proportion of severely impaired members would have increased from 6.3 percent at Elderplan to 16.5 percent and from 5.7 percent to 10.1 percent at Seniors Plus. In addition to greatly increasing the cost of chronic care benefits at these sites, these additional disabled likely would have had a significant impact on hospital use. This has important implications for not only the future viability of SHMOs but also any HMO that offers benefits that are attractive to the disabled and chronically ill. Current Medicare policy does not permit health screening, nor does its current reimbursement policy adequately reflect case-mix.
Utilization And Costs
The analyses of utilization and costs cover hospital use, expanded care costs, and the overall financial performance of the plans for calendar year 1986. Although these statistics are based upon early experience and thus must be viewed with caution, the evidence suggests that all of the sites have control over major service components and that when losses are occurring, these losses are not greatly attributable to hospital or expanded care utilization.
Hospital use. The ability of the SHMO to reduce hospital utilization below fee-for-service use and to stay within budgeted use rates is essential to the viability of the model. Exhibit 7 presents hospital use capitation estimates and actual experience for 1986. The exhibit also shows the actual hospital use rates of Medicare beneficiaries living in the counties served by the SHMOs in 1984. Because 1984 was the last year that the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) collected use rates by county, 1984 county rates were trended forward to 1986 assuming a 10 percent annual decline in hospital utilization in the community. This is slightly lower than the national decline of 12 percent between 1984 and 1985, since it is unlikely that such a sharp decrease was maintained in 1985-1986, especially in the counties under study. Hospital use is being monitored closely, and future reports will present updates should changes occur. Cost of expanded care benefits. The SHMO sites provide members a full range of acute medical and ancillary services similar to high-option HMOs, and in addition they offer .a unique set of prepaid, case-managed expanded care benefits that-cover chronic conditions excluded by Medicare and private insurance. SHMOs cover expanded care benefits up to $6,000 to $12,000 per year in service costs (with variations in benefit levels and copayments by site). These community-based services are provided to frail members who qualify. A full range of long term care services are available, including homemaker, personal care aide, respite, adult day health care, and transportation. Nursing home services also are available within the expanded care benefit limits without Medicare's prior hospital or skill level requirements. Case-management services are provided as administrative services; that is, costs are not. charged to the member's benefit limit.
One of the major questions that the SHMO was designed to address is whether, in the context of a managed care system, home and communitybased services are an insurable risk. That is, could the plans control these benefits such that they stayed within their capitation estimates? The initial expanded care service cost experience is encouraging, as indicated in Exhibit 8, which presents both the estimated (budgeted) and actual expended services costs at each of the sites. Also included are costs of administering and managing the benefit. Service costs range from $15.99 to $33.50 per member per month, or about 10 percent to 15 percent of the Medicare AAPCC. Two of the sites, Elderplan and Seniors Plus, are at or near their capitation estimates. SCAN is somewhat above initial estimates. Kaiser Permanente is substantially below its budgeted amounts. Case-management costs also show variation across sites. Again, Kaiser is the lowest, at $6.61 per member per month, with the other three ranging between $9.22 and $14.61 per member per month. The differences appear to be a combination of less efficient operations during enrollment buildup periods at the slower enrollment sites, as well as broader ranges of tasks for the case-management units at Elderplan and SCAN, which perform hospital discharge planning from their casemanagement units. 5 The SHMO Consortium will be focusing much research attention on better understanding the causes of these differences across sites in both service and case-management costs. We intend to research the implications for equity and efficiency, and, if necessary, develop improved mechanisms for allocation of these expanded care benefits.
Financial Performance
From the inception of the demonstration, planners, sponsors, and government officials recognized that SHMOs posed risk in many areas: unknown product, enrollment levels, adverse selection, organizational management, and accuracy of reimbursement. In recognition of this, Medicare and Medicaid agreed to share risk with sponsors for program losses during the first two contract years (the first "year" being eighteen months long). The loss limits for sponsors were set between about $150,000 and $400,000 for the first year and double for the second. Medicare and Medicaid assumed responsibility or the balance of losses.
These arrangements have proven to be crucial to the survival of three of the plans. Elderplan, SCAN, and Seniors Plus experienced losses of about $4 million, $2 million, and $1 million, respectively, during the first eighteen months of operations. Seniors Plus should show a surplus for the subsequent twelve-month period, but Elderplan and SCAN are still running substantial deficits.
Kaiser Permanente, in contrast, ran a first-year surplus of over $675,000 on expanded care benefit operations and continues to operate in the black in this area. Because actual expenses to the Kaiser Permanente SHMO program for the remainder of the package were the capitation rates derived through the TEFRA adjusted community rate (ACR) methodology, the revenue actually equaled the expenses to the program. Therefore, the concept of making or losing money on the nonchronic care portion is not at issue to the program once the capitation rates with the larger Kaiser system are established. It is beyond the scope of this article to determine whether the larger Kaiser system experienced a surplus or deficit on capitation.
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The sources of the three sites' losses lie primarily in high marketing and Sales budgets and administration that has not yet reached economies of scale, rather than in the scope of benefits or inability to manage services. Thus, Seniors Plus has been able to cut back on marketing and take advantage of Group Health's administrative services to break even at a level that would not be possible at SCAN and Elderplan. These latter two plans must continue marketing to obtain enough members to support their full HMO administrative costs,
Conclusions
This initial update on the progress of the National SHMO Demonstration has identified areas of unresolved problems for one or more of the sites as well as areas of considerable progress toward goals. Each of these areas, in turn, presents both management issues and public policy implications.
Marketing. Marketing remains the biggest obstacle to the financial viability of two of the four sites. Part of this issue may disappear as the population becomes more knowledgeable about the shortcomings of their existing coverage. However, even if educational efforts succeed, the current Medicare policy of open enrollment with no health screening still gives older persons an incentive to seek less-expensive coverage until they need chronic care services, which in turn promotes adverse selection.
If queuing cannot be made smooth and equitable, another possible solution for controlling sponsors' selection risk would be to make SHMO benefits available to people only when they become eligible for Medicare, when prevalence of impairment is much lower. If they do not choose this higher option when they reach age sixty-five, then they would not be permitted to pick up that coverage later. This is not a very good social solution, however, until many more people can be convinced they need better long-term care coverage. Clearly, there is more to be learned about what the elderly want from a health plan and the best ways to market and sell to them.
Financial feasibility. The high per member per month administrative costs of the two stand-alone plans and, hence, considerably higher breakeven enrollment suggests that HMO-affiliated models for the SHMO may be the easier path for future sponsors. However, if HMOs are to be encouraged to develop SHMO-like benefit packages, appropriate casemix-adjusted reimbursement methods must be developed. Furthermore, there may be social value in having stand-alone, seniors-only, community-based programs. It would be a mistake to prematurely cut off this option, if these models can show improved methods or outcomes in 7 8 HEALTH AFFAIRS | Summer 1988 caring for the elderly.
Utilization and service costs. The SHMOs' early utilization and cost experience has been very encouraging. Use of both hospital and chronic care services has been near capitation estimates during this time at all sites. If this experience continues, the SHMO will prove to be a viable service delivery model, and expanded care benefits will be affordable to both individuals and Medicare.
Future directions and research. The SHMOs' memberships appear to be very similar to the general Medicare population in age, sex, living arrangements, and impairment. This makes the SHMO demonstration an ideal research and demonstration setting for shedding light on a variety of financing and service delivery issues that are relevant not only to the SHMO, but also to other contexts. Some of this research is already near completion, including consortium studies that indicate how services are being integrated with Medicare, hospitals, and nursing homes, and how access to the benefit is being managed through case management and a series of eligibility screens, benefit limits, and copayments. 6 Continuing research will identify cross-site patterns in criteria for eligibility for and use of expanded care benefits. 7 Further down the road, SHMO experience could shed light on the feasibility of bringing expanded benefits to broader populations by testing alternative benefit packages, administrative arrangements, financing, and organization of services. The major shortcoming of the SHMO model is its broad replicability. As currently financed, administered, and marketed, any new sites are likely to need HMO affiliations, a condition that excludes many parts of the nation. To expand Medicare benefits as a program rather than a demonstration, feasibility must be demonstrated in other settings and conditions. Many questions could be articulated and addressed in new demonstrations, including: (1) What roles could be played by carriers, intermediaries, insurers, preferred provider organizations (Pros), and other financiers and organizers of care in administering new benefits? (2) What organizations could perform case-management functions? (3) Could new reimbursement arrangements such as partial capitations, special underwriting formulas, and limited risk corridors allow non-HMOs to enter into managed care for high-risk groups under Medicare? (4) What are the best approaches to limiting problems associated with marketing, enrollment, and selection bias? (5) How can we best meet the needs of special populations (for example, mentally impaired, rural, under age sixty-five and disabled, Medicaid recipients)? (6) How can quality be defined and assured for expanded care benefits? There clearly is a full plate for future research and demonstration on concepts and arrangements being tested in the SHMO. 
